A Fine Line between Russian Propaganda and Freedom of Expression

 
How can we counter hostile Russian propaganda without infringing upon freedom of expression, diversity of opinion, or ideological pluralism in our society? It is the old dilemma of squaring the circle, finding a way to eat the cake and feel “full” without sacrificing the cake, so it remains “whole.” In our case, the “cake-eater” is Russian propaganda that threatens us and seems impossible to banish or “neutralize” unless we sacrifice the “cake” of freedom of expression in Moldova.  
 
Let us consider a recent example: in late August, the Government announced its intention to include the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova in the agenda of the UN General Assembly. (Meanwhile, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, this issue has actually been included in the agenda of the General Assembly and will be discussed in October). Most Russian TV channels, including those broadcast in Moldova, covered this event as Chisinau’s intention to ask the UN to withdraw the Russian troops that are in the “peacekeeping mission” on the Dniester, deliberately mistaking them (five battalions of Russian troops who are in the Transnistrian Conflict Security Zone following the ceasefire agreement signed by presidents Snegur and Yeltsin on July 21, 1992) for the units of the 14th Army that have been there since the Soviet times, including ammunition and weapons depots from Cobasna, which currently belong to the Russian armed forces.
 
Although Chisinau’s initiative only targets the Russian troops, weapons, and munitions left from the Soviet times (over 40 thousand tons), which Russia committed to withdraw by the end of 2002 at the OSCE summit held in Istanbul in 1999 (and withdrew a large part of them), the Russian press deliberately distorted Chisinau's message, accusing the current government of intentions to tension the situation and to “defreeze” the Transnistrian conflict at Washington “orders.” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also qualified Chisinau’s initiative to address the UN as “provocative,” and Sergey Lavrov maintained that confusion in his speech to the Moscow university MGIMO students on September 1. The hysteria for maintaining the status quo, but actually preparing Russian and Moldovan citizens for a new war on the Dniester (unfortunately, local politicians, including President Dodon, have been involved in this campaign), continued after the Russian Ambassador Farid Mukhametshin was invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and told that Chisinau’s initiative at the UN did not concern the “peacekeeping mission” on the Dniester.
What can be done in this situation? Who is responsible for protecting the information space, who and how should act to counter this Russian media aggression against Moldova, which takes the form of falsifying the message of the government, accusing it of evil intentions, and threatening Moldovan citizens from both banks with the possibility of war on the Dniester (in order to prepare public opinion for an eventual armed attack against Moldova)?
The first natural and certainly instinctive reaction is closing the access of hostile, diversionary information sources to our information space as soon as possible, the way Ukraine did, which is at war with Russia, because information transformed into propaganda becomes a weapon. A military offensive is no longer preceded by an artillery attack as it was in the past; it has been replaced by brainwashing, as Linas Linkevicius, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, stated at the recent conference, Media, Audience, and Pluralism in the Republic of Moldova, held in Chisinau.
However, although our legislation, the Broadcasting Code, does not provide for such a situation (the notion of “propaganda” is not even included in the Broadcasting Code, and license withdrawal for violations of the code is a rather complicated and lengthy procedure which can be challenged in court), if we block Russian propaganda TV channels, not only Moscow, but also Washington and Brussels will start crying out that pluralism is at the point of death and has to be saved immediately. The case of Ukraine is considered to be a singular one. The fight against propagandistic media financed from abroad must not affect pluralism; “all the voices should be heard” was US Ambassador James Pettit message at the opening of that conference. 
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Moldova urgently needs a local “Task Force” in order to develop an adequate, operational, and long-term strategy and weapons to keep the “hungry cake-eater” of Russian propaganda at a distance, “neutralizing” it without being forced to eat the “cake” of freedom of expression and pluralism in the country.
As long as we do not have such a structure (perhaps even as part of the Broadcasting Coordinating Council), all the other actions – adjusting legislation to new conditions, spreading media literacy among citizens, especially young people, demonopolization, de-Sovietization, and strengthening of independent media, of domestic media product, of public television, funded today from the bottom of the budget bag, just so no one could say it is not financed, and so on, and so forth – will not have any proper effect. One does not go hunting equipped to the teeth, but leaving the rifle at home. Without a “rifle” such as the “Task Force,” authorities’ talks about protecting the information space and countering Russian propaganda are mere lip service.