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Media Researcher
Background
Foreign propaganda is probably the ‘worst’ that could happen to the media sector. Moldovan authorities have been worried about this issue over the last two years. In order to justify their desire to fight propaganda, the authorities (read PDM) tried to regulate this ‘problem’ by making amendments to laws. It all started with a legislative initiative (Law No 257), submitted by PDM and PPEM MPs, which was later called by mass media – ‘the anti-propaganda law’.
The law provided for the amendment of the Broadcasting Code in order to limit the rebroadcasting on the territory of the Republic of Moldova of information, analytical, political and military broadcasts from states that have not ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. On 7 December 2017, the law was voted in first and second reading by 61 MPs from PDM, PL, PLDM and PPEM. The Socialists and Communists opposed. After a ping-pong with the socialists, who had objections against the law, and after a new suspension of President Igor Dodon because he refused to promulgate the law, on 10 January 2018, the Constitutional Court granted the Speaker Andrian Candu presidential duties and he signed its promulgation.
Does the Republic of Moldova get a special treatment?
First, the existence of such a law is a mistake, a big mistake. I hope that this mistake will not be imposed and squeezed through the back door in the final version of the new Code of Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova (alias Broadcasting Code). We know very well how inventive can be our lawmakers. Why is this a mistake? Main argument: The Republic of Moldova is the only (!) – I repeat, the only country in Europe – the European Union and the Council of Europe, which adopted such a law, even if the national and international organizations were suspicious and critical about it. EU, Freedom House and OSCE recommended that ‘[t]here should not be any attempts to ban propaganda through legislation, as this notion and what is related to it are difficult to define objectively.’
Second, the international community represented by the US Ambassador James Petit and by the head of EU Delegation Peter Michalko did not welcome the law. They suggested to rather struggle with media concentration and internal propaganda.
Third, as usual, Moldovans began to treat the disease, not the symptoms. They started with the end, not with the beginning, like it would be logical to do. I’ll explain this. In such situations, it would be right to develop a strategy with a concrete action plan on the issue: how we fight with external propaganda. In other words, the situation/issue had to be thoroughly analysed, and only after that, a policy document on the effect and impact of external propaganda must be compiled. Subsequently, the law could be drafted on the basis of this/these strategy paper(s), if such a law was needed, of course.
Fourth, what are we going to do about the freedom of speech? Prohibiting access to a certain content can be for sure regarded as restricted access to information. In this case, maybe it is not necessary to apply restrictive provisions, but to combat propaganda by using more soft means: media literacy policies, for example. This approach is more strategic, more efficient and, most important, it is in line with democratic rules.
And, fifth, here is a simple question: Dear BCC, what are we going to do about the content produced by the media from Denmark, Sweden and Belgium (countries leading the charts concerning the freedom and independence of the media) that have not ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television?
How the law ‘worked’ so far...
If analysing how BCC implemented this law on the basis of just a few examples, then we can picture the following:
The first ‘correction’ was applied to RTR Moldova TV channel. On 26 February 2018, this TV channel was fined with MDL 50,000 for violating the provisions of broadcasting informative programs from the Russian Federation. RTR Moldova disagreed with this decision and, – attention! (see line No 1 in the section below) - claimed that those news were edited in Chisinau using the information provided by contract by the Russian partner TV channels (SIC!).
The second ‘correction’ was applied to Prime TV channel. At the beginning of April, the BCC fined this TV channel with MDL 70,000 for violating the provisions of this law. CCA members sanctioned Prime TV channel on the basis of a notice (!) filed by WatchDog. Finding... with a cool mind: BCC proved to be selective in monitoring and imposing fines on the basis of this law. I'm not sure that the BCC would have taken note (it’s still about Prime TV) and come up with corrections and penalties against this television without the WatchDog notice. But, you never know...
The third ‘correction’ was applied again to RTR Moldova TV channel. The BCC fined this channel with MDL 85,000 for broadcasting the ‘9 May Victory Parade from Moscow’. By the way, the TV channels NTV Moldova and Accent TV also broadcasted images from the 9 May Victory Parade from Moscow. The ‘correction’ and the repeated violation of those from RTR Moldova suggest two ideas:
First: I tend to think that media outlets that repeatedly violate these legal provisions know very well what are they doing and are aware that their licence is... at stake. If so, either they are naive – which I don’t believe – or they are provided with lots of money and can afford to pay first MDL 50 thousand and then MDL 85 thousand. Thus, it appears that the law is ineffective and that it is not taken seriously.
Second: As mentioned earlier, the propagandistic goal is much more important than those 2.5 and 4 thousand euro spent for fines. Those few thousand euro are little money for the Russian Government that owns the parent company of RTR, especially when you have such a ‘noble’ goal: to broadcast the parade on 9 May Victory Parade from the Red Square in Moscow.
Why did not the anti-propaganda law and will not have the expected results?
Going back to the fact that the law did not and will not give the expected results:
The media outlets that were broadcasting the content produced in the Russian Federation (it’s about this information space) were slick: they stopped broadcasting the finable content and simply packed it into what they later called ‘own content’. In other words, they take the images from NTV, Россия 24 or First Channel, adapt them a bit and present them as own product. This is why the representatives of the development partners said that internal propaganda would be more important to combat.
Let us assume that other media outlets will be fined and will be forced by BCC's decision to pay MDL 30 or 40 thousand. I do not think that this money would be the biggest problem for those who have the goal to broadcast and multiply propaganda information. Do you remember the investigation of Rise Moldova: ‘Dodon's money from the Bahamas’, with transfers amounting to over MDL 30 million made to ‘Exclusiv Media SRL’ accounts, which owns NTV Moldova and Accent TV? With such donations, you can afford to pay every day the fines imposed by BCC.
In conclusion, such laws can easily become bats to fight the ‘media’ that do not comply with the ‘political patterns’.
What is lost when something is ‘gained’
What have we lost?
We lost the trust of our development partners. For the umpteenth time, their recommendations and suggestions were overlooked. The situation is at least awkward when everyone around say you are on the wrong way, and you keep pushing it and being stubborn.
For the umpteenth time the Broadcasting Code, which during the last 12 years was amended more than 100 times, was complemented with one new amendment.
The BCC proved (again!) to be an institution that knows nothing about independence in its true meaning. The example of Prime TV (already mentioned) is one of the few, and I'm sure that others will come.
What is the logic and explanation of drafting and adopting amendments to a law, which, you know very well, is to be repealed within half a year, once the new Code enters into force?
What have we won?
One thing: a party (in fact, a few, but one was in the centre of attention) took a daring attitude and played the role of the big defender of the media and information space in the Republic of Moldova. Ironically, (and ridiculously!) some televisions owned by the representatives of this party were also fined because they did not comply with the new legal provisions.
Therefore, the effects of the law were minimal. Media expert, Petru Macovei has recently mentioned that after the adoption of the law, ‘we still have Russian propaganda, it only took the shape of national product.’ In other words, external propaganda does not disappear, it just ‘turns’ into internal propaganda.
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The article was published within the Advocacy Campaigns Aimed at Improving Transparency of Media Ownership, Access to Information and promotion of EU values and integration project, implemented by the IJC, which is, in its turn, part of the Moldova Partnerships for Sustainable Civil Society project, implemented by FHI 360.This article is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The content are the responsibility of author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.
